We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined subset of Nash equilibria can be supported as competitive equilibria. Considering an offer-based trading dynamic as well as a stochastic price clock market, we prove new convergence results to Nash equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, providing a rationale for stability properties in decentralized, dynamic trading networks. Turning to the tension between fairness and (core) stability, we prove several negative results: inessential agents always receive zero utility in any core outcome, and even essential agents can get zero utility in all core outcomes.

翻译：基于交易网络框架 [Hatfield et al., 2013]，我们探讨了具有双边合约的去中心化网络化市场中的稳定性与公平性问题。在我们的交易网络博弈中，我们证明一个定义明确的纳什均衡子集可以被支持为竞争均衡。通过考虑基于报价的交易动态以及随机价格时钟市场，我们证明了向纳什均衡与竞争均衡收敛的新结果，为去中心化动态交易网络的稳定性提供了理论依据。针对公平性与（核）稳定性之间的张力，我们证明了若干负面结论：在任何核结果中，非必要参与者总是获得零效用，而即使是必要参与者也可能在所有核结果中获得零效用。