The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has introduced millions of resource-constrained devices into critical infrastructures, consumer environments, and industrial systems. These devices rely on lightweight communication protocols such as MQTT to support low-power, intermittent, and bandwidth-limited operation. However, common TLS algorithms used to secure MQTT communications are vulnerable to quantum attacks made feasible by Shor's algorithm. As a result, IoT infrastructures must evaluate and adopt post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) methods capable of providing long-term resilience. This report investigates the implementation of PQC algorithms within an MQTT-based IoT networks using three Raspberry Pis. Specifically, it integrates the FALCON digital signature scheme, one of NIST's selected post-quantum signature algorithms, to maintain message authenticity and integrity across resource-constrained MQTT clients and brokers. By measuring system performance, the research characterizes the practical trade-offs of deploying lattice-based PQC on lightweight hardware.

翻译：物联网（IoT）的快速扩展已将数百万资源受限设备引入关键基础设施、消费环境和工业系统。这些设备依赖MQTT等轻量级通信协议来支持低功耗、间歇性和带宽受限的运行。然而，用于保护MQTT通信安全的常见TLS算法容易受到Shor算法实现的量子攻击。因此，物联网基础设施必须评估并采用能够提供长期抗性的后量子密码（PQC）方法。本报告研究了在基于MQTT的物联网网络中，使用三台树莓派实现PQC算法。具体而言，它集成了NIST选定的后量子签名算法之一FALCON数字签名方案，以维护资源受限MQTT客户端和代理之间的消息真实性和完整性。通过测量系统性能，该研究表征了在轻量级硬件上部署基于格的PQC的实际权衡。