Decentralized protocols claim immutable, rule-based execution, yet many embed emergency mechanisms such as chain-level freezes, protocol pauses, and account quarantines. These overrides are crucial for responding to exploits and systemic failures, but they expose a core tension: when does intervention preserve trust and when is it perceived as illegitimate discretion? With approximately $10$ billion in technical exploit losses potentially addressable by onchain intervention (2016--2026), the design of these mechanisms has high practical stakes, but current approaches remain ad hoc and ideologically charged. We address this gap by developing a Scope $\times$ Authority taxonomy that maps the design space of emergency architectures along two dimensions: the precision of the intervention and the concentration of trigger authority. We formalize the resulting tradeoffs of a standing centralization cost versus containment speed and collateral disruption as a stochastic cost-minimization problem; and derive three testable predictions. Assessing these predictions against 705 documented exploit incidents, we find that containment time varies systematically by authority type; that losses follow a heavy-tailed distribution ($α\approx 1.33$) concentrating risk in rare catastrophic events; and that community sentiment measurably modulates the effective cost of maintaining intervention capability. The analysis yields concrete design principles that move emergency governance from ideological debate towards quantitative engineering.

翻译：去中心化协议宣称其执行具有不可变性与规则约束性，然而许多协议仍嵌入了紧急干预机制，例如链级冻结、协议暂停和账户隔离。这些干预措施对于应对漏洞利用和系统性故障至关重要，但也揭示了一个核心矛盾：干预何时能维护信任，何时又会被视为不合法的自由裁量？鉴于约100亿美元的技术性漏洞损失可能通过链上干预得以解决（2016–2026年），这些机制的设计具有重大的现实意义，但当前方法仍具临时性且受意识形态影响。为填补这一空白，我们构建了一个“干预范围×触发权限”分类框架，从干预精度与触发权集中度两个维度刻画了紧急架构的设计空间。我们将由此产生的长期中心化成本与遏制速度、附带损害之间的权衡形式化为一个随机成本最小化问题，并推导出三个可检验的预测。基于对705起已记录漏洞事件的分析，我们发现：遏制时间随权限类型呈现系统性差异；损失遵循重尾分布（α≈1.33），风险集中于罕见的灾难性事件；社区情绪可测量地调节维持干预能力的有效成本。本分析提出了具体的设计原则，推动紧急治理从意识形态争论转向定量化工程实践。