Large-scale load-altering attacks (LAAs) are known to severely disrupt power grid operations by manipulating several internet-of-things (IoT)-enabled load devices. In this work, we analyze power grid cascading failures induced by such attacks. The inherent security features in power grids such as the $N-1$ design philosophy dictate LAAs that can trigger cascading failures are \emph{rare} events. We overcome the challenge of efficiently sampling critical LAAs scenarios for a wide range of attack parameters by using the so-called ``skipping sampler'' algorithm. We conduct extensive simulations using a three-area IEEE-39 bus system and provide several novel insights into the composition of cascades due to LAAs. Our results highlight the particular risks to modern power systems posed by strategically designed coordinated LAAs that exploit their structural and real-time operating characteristics.

翻译：大规模负荷修改攻击（LAAs）通过操控大量物联网（IoT）使能负荷设备，已知会严重破坏电网运行。本文分析了此类攻击引发的电网连锁故障。电网固有安全特性（如N-1设计原则）决定了能够触发连锁故障的LAAs属于罕见事件。我们采用称为“跳跃采样器”的算法，克服了在广泛攻击参数范围内高效采样关键LAAs场景的挑战。基于三区域IEEE-39总线系统进行了广泛仿真，并针对LAAs引发的连锁故障组成提出了若干新见解。研究结果突显了策略性设计的协调型LAAs利用现代电力系统结构与实时运行特性所带来的特殊风险。