Almost all courts to interpret Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act have construed its ambiguously worded immunity provision broadly, shielding Internet intermediaries from tort liability so long as they are not the literal authors of offensive content. Although this broad interpretation effects the basic goals of the statute, it ignores several serious textual difficulties and mistakenly extends protection too far by immunizing even direct participants in tortuous conduct. This analysis, which examines the text and history of Section 230 in light of two strains of pre-Internet vicarious liability defamation doctrine, concludes that the immunity provision of Section 230, though broad, was not intended to abrogate entirely traditional common law notions of vicarious liability. Some bases of vicarious liability remain, and their continuing validity both explains the textual puzzles courts have faced in applying Section 230 and undergirds the push by a small minority of courts to narrow the section's immunity provision.

翻译：几乎所有解释《通信规范法》第230条的法院均将其措辞模糊的豁免条款作广义解释，只要互联网中介机构并非冒犯性内容的字面作者，即免除其侵权责任。尽管这种广义解释实现了该法条的基本目标，但它忽视了若干严重的文本难题，并通过豁免甚至直接参与侵权行为的当事人错误地过度延伸了保护范围。本文結合互联网时代前两种替代性责任诽谤法理脉络，对第230条的文本与历史进行分析，指出第230条的豁免条款虽范围广泛，但无意完全废除传统普通法中的替代性责任概念。某些替代性责任基础依然存在，其持续有效性既解释了法院适用第230条时所面临的文本谜题，也支撑着少数法院推动限制该条豁免条款的趋势。