It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and bribery. These problems model scenarios such as voters casting strategic votes and agents campaigning for voters to change their votes to make a desired candidate win. A common assumption is that the preferences of the voters follow the structure of a domain restriction such as single peakedness, and so manipulators only consider votes that also satisfy this restriction. We introduce the model where the preferences of the voters define their own restriction and strategic actions must ``conform'' by using only these votes. In this model, the election after manipulation will retain common domain restrictions. We explore the computational complexity of conformant manipulative actions and we discuss how conformant manipulative actions relate to other manipulative actions.

翻译：研究策略性主体如何影响选举结果具有重要意义。计算选举学领域对操纵与贿赂等操纵性行动复杂性的研究已有大量文献。这类问题模拟的场景包括：选民投出策略性选票、代理人游说选民改变投票以促使期望候选人获胜等。现有研究通常假设选民偏好遵循单一峰值等领域限制结构，因此操纵者仅考虑满足该限制的选票。我们提出一种新模型：由选民偏好自行定义其限制，策略性行动必须通过仅使用这些选票来“保持一致”。在该模型中，操纵后的选举将保留共同的领域限制。我们探讨了一致性操纵行动的计算复杂性，并讨论了此类行动与其他操纵行动的关联。