We consider misinformation games, i.e., multi-agent interactions where the players are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an \emph{incorrect} understanding of the game setting, without being aware of their misinformation. In this paper, we introduce and study a new family of misinformation games, called Noisy games, where misinformation is due to structured (white) noise that affects additively the payoff values of players. We analyse the general properties of Noisy games and derive theoretical formulas related to ``behavioural consistency'', i.e., the probability that the players behaviour will not be significantly affected by the noise. We show several properties of these formulas, and present an experimental evaluation that validates and visualises these results.

翻译：我们考虑错误信息博弈，即参与者对其所参与的博弈存在错误认知的多智能体交互场景，本质上参与者对博弈设定存在"不正确"理解，却未意识到自身的错误认知。本文提出并研究了一类新型错误信息博弈——噪声博弈，其中错误信息源于对参与者收益值产生加性影响的结构化（白）噪声。我们分析了噪声博弈的普遍性质，推导出与"行为一致性"相关的理论公式，即参与者行为不受噪声显著影响的概率。我们展示了这些公式的若干性质，并给出了验证与可视化这些结果的实验评估。