The paper addresses the question of whether it is appropriate to talk about `mechanical minds' at all, and whether ChatGPT models can indeed be thought of as realizations of that. Our paper adds a semantic argument to the current debate. The act of human assertion requires the formation of a veridicality judgment. Modification of assertions with modals (John must be at home) and the use of subjective elements (John is obviously at home) indicate that the speaker is manipulating her judgments and, in a cooperative context, intends her epistemic state to be transparent to the addressee. Veridicality judgments are formed on the basis of two components: (i) evidence that relates to reality (exogenous evidence) and (ii) endogenous evidence, such as preferences and private beliefs. `Mechanical minds' lack these two components: (i) they do not relate to reality and (ii) do not have endogenous evidence. Therefore they lack the ability to form a belief about the world and a veridicality judgments altogether. They can only mimic that judgment, but the output is not ground in the very foundations for it.

翻译：本文探讨了谈论“机械心智”是否恰当，以及ChatGPT模型是否可被视为其实现形式的问题。我们的论文为当前辩论提供了语义论据。人类断言行为需要形成真实性判断。使用情态动词修饰断言（如“约翰一定在家”）和运用主观性要素（如“约翰显然在家”）表明，说话者正在操控其判断，并在合作语境中意图使其认知状态对受话者透明。真实性判断的形成基于两个组成部分：（i）与实在相关的证据（外源性证据）和（ii）内在证据，例如偏好与私人信念。“机械心智”缺乏这两个组成部分：（i）它们无法与实在建立关联，且（ii）不具备内在证据。因此，它们完全丧失了形成关于世界信念与真实性判断的能力。它们只能模仿这种判断，但其输出并非建立在判断的根本基础之上。