Aerial base stations (ABSs) can rapidly establish connectivity in ad hoc, infrastructure-deprived environments, but their broadcast, line-of-sight transmissions leak far beyond the intended service area, exposing communications to passive eavesdropping and interference. Prior physical layer defenses based on cooperative jamming typically assume known eavesdropper locations, simplified statistical channels, or continuously repositioned jammers. We instead pose the problem as a radio frequency (RF) containment: confining usable signal to a user-defined, arbitrarily-shaped target zone while denying it elsewhere independent of eavesdropper location. We present ARCTAN, a gradient-based optimization framework that jointly optimizes the position, orientation, and transmit power of stationary ABSs and cooperative jammers (CJs) by backpropagating through site-specific, differentiable 3D ray traced channels. Evaluated in a high-fidelity digital twin across three target zone geometries, ARCTAN achieves a mean in-zone SINR of approximately 10 dB while reducing mean out-of-zone SINR from 13-16 dB to -3-5 dB, and suppressing signal-leakage ratios from over 93% to below 46% requiring at most 10 of 12 candidate CJs.

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