The concept of cyber deception has been receiving emerging attention. The development of cyber defensive deception techniques requires interdisciplinary work, among which cognitive science plays an important role. In this work, we adopt a signaling game framework between a defender and a human agent to develop a cyber defensive deception protocol that takes advantage of the cognitive biases of human decision-making using quantum decision theory to combat insider attacks (IA). The defender deceives an inside human attacker by luring him to access decoy sensors via generators producing perceptions of classical signals to manipulate the human attacker's psychological state of mind. Our results reveal that even without changing the classical traffic data, strategically designed generators can result in a worse performance for defending against insider attackers in identifying decoys than the ones in the deceptive scheme without generators, which generate random information based on input signals. The proposed framework leads to fundamental theories in designing more effective signaling schemes.

翻译：网络欺骗的概念正日益受到关注。发展网络防御欺骗技术需要跨学科合作，其中认知科学发挥着重要作用。本研究采用防御者与人类主体之间的信号博弈框架，利用量子决策理论对人类决策过程中的认知偏差进行建模，设计了一种针对内部攻击（IA）的网络防御欺骗协议。防御者通过生成经典信号感知的诱饵传感器产生器，诱使内部人类攻击者访问诱饵，从而操纵其心理状态。研究结果表明，即使不改变经典流量数据，策略性设计的产生器在防御内部攻击者识别诱饵时，其表现反而劣于基于输入信号生成随机信息的无产生器欺骗方案。所提出的框架为设计更有效的信号方案奠定了理论基础。