In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner revenue and Dominating-Strategy-Incentive-Compatible (DSIC) for users. However, a positive miner revenue is important in practice to motivate miners. To address this challenge, we consider a Bayesian game setting and relax the DSIC requirement for users to Bayesian-Nash-Incentive-Compatibility (BNIC). In particular, we propose an auxiliary mechanism method that makes connections between BNIC and DSIC mechanisms. With the auxiliary mechanism method, we design a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) based on the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model, and prove that the TFM has both BNIC and collusion-proof properties with an asymptotic constant-factor approximation of optimal miner revenue for i.i.d. bounded valuations. Our result breaks the zero-revenue barrier while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties.

翻译：在区块链系统中，交易费用机制的设计对于确保矿工和用户双方的稳定性及满意度至关重要。近期研究证明了无法同时实现矿工非零收益与用户占优策略激励相容（DSIC）的抗合谋机制。然而，在实践中，正向的矿工收益对于激励矿工具有重要意义。为应对这一挑战，我们考虑贝叶斯博弈场景，将用户的DSIC要求放宽为贝叶斯-纳什激励相容（BNIC）。具体而言，我们提出了一种辅助机制方法，建立BNIC机制与DSIC机制之间的关联。借助该辅助机制方法，我们基于多项逻辑（MNL）选择模型设计了一种交易费用机制（TFM），并证明该机制在独立同分布有界估值下具备BNIC与抗合谋特性，且能以渐进常数因子逼近最优矿工收益。我们的研究在保持诚实性与抗合谋特性的同时，突破了零收益瓶颈。