We study actual bidding behavior when a new auction format gets introduced into the marketplace. More specifically, we investigate this question using a novel dataset on internet display advertising auctions that exploits a staggered adoption by different publishers (sellers) of first-price auctions (FPAs), instead of the traditional second-price auctions (SPAs). We analyze the auction format change using difference-in-differences regressions and a synthetic difference-in-differences estimator, which better handles pre-trends. The results show that revenue per sold impression (price) jumps considerably for treated publishers relative to control publishers, with increases ranging from 25% to 75% of the pre-treatment price level of the treated group. Moreover, for later auction format changes, the increase in price levels under FPAs relative to those under SPAs tends to dissipate over time, reminiscent of the revenue equivalence theorem, although the extent of this reversion depends on the specification. We view these results as suggestive of initially insufficient bid shading following the format change, as opposed to an immediate transition to a new Bayesian Nash equilibrium, with prices tending to decline in several specifications in a manner consistent with gradual adjustment in bidding behavior as bidders learn to shade their bids. Our work constitutes one of the first field studies on bidders'responses to auction format changes, providing an important complement to theoretical model predictions. As such, it provides valuable information to auction designers when considering the implementation of different formats.

翻译：暂无翻译