Approval voting is a simple and well-regarded voting rule: voters submit approval ballots (subsets of the candidates) and the candidate receiving the most approvals wins. One major limitation of approval voting is that it is not clear which candidates voters should approve if they have an underlying strict order over the candidates. In this paper, we initiate the study of approval voting under a simple kind of information: plurality polls. That is, we assume that for each candidate we know the share of voters who rank this candidate as their top choice. Using these plurality polls, we suggest a simple protocol parameterized by a fraction $k \in (0,1)$: every voter should approve the smallest prefix of their preference list containing the first choices of at least a fraction $k$ of the voters. We evaluate this protocol via the framework of metric distortion and show that for the optimal choice of $k$, this rule achieves a metric distortion of $2 + \sqrt{5} \simeq 4.236$. The proof techniques we use for this statement also show that the Bucklin voting rule has a metric distortion of at most $5$. Finally, we evaluate the robustness of our protocol to noise and show that the upper bounds obtained for our protocol are tight.

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