We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender (resp. attacker) is to minimize (resp. maximize) the expected number of undetected attacks by selecting a potentially randomized inspection (resp. attack) strategy. We analytically characterize Nash equilibria of this large-scale zero-sum game when every vulnerable network component can be monitored from a unique sensor location. We then leverage our equilibrium analysis to design a heuristic solution approach based on minimum set covers for computing inspection strategies in general. Our computational results on a benchmark cyber-physical distribution network illustrate the performance and computational tractability of our solution approach.

翻译：我们考虑一种双人网络检测博弈，其中防御方部署具有潜在异构检测能力的传感器，以检测由战略性攻击者发起的多重攻击。防御方（相应地，攻击方）的目标是通过选择潜在随机化的检测（相应地，攻击）策略来最小化（相应地，最大化）未被检测到的攻击的期望数量。当每个易受攻击的网络组件可以从唯一的传感器位置进行监控时，我们对这一大规模零和博弈的纳什均衡进行了分析刻画。随后，我们利用均衡分析设计了一种基于最小集合覆盖的启发式求解方法，用于一般情况下的检测策略计算。我们在一个基准的赛博物理配电网上的计算结果表明，我们的求解方法具有良好的性能和计算可处理性。