Optimistic rollups are a popular and promising method of increasing the throughput capacity of their underlying chain. These methods rely on economic incentives to guarantee their security. We present a model of optimistic rollups that suggests that the incentives are not necessarily aligned with the expected behavior of the players, thus potentially undermining the security of existing optimistic rollups. We discuss some potential solutions illuminated by our model.

翻译：乐观Rollup是一种流行且有前景的方法，用于提升其底层链的吞吐容量。这些方法依赖经济激励来确保安全性。我们提出了一个乐观Rollup模型，该模型表明激励不一定与参与者的预期行为一致，因此可能削弱现有乐观Rollup的安全性。我们讨论了一些由该模型揭示的潜在解决方案。