Offline retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) on edge devices is updated through signed knowledge packs that carry text and precomputed embedding vectors. A signature proves who published a pack, not that its vectors encode its text. We study this text-vector integrity gap. A verifier that recomputes vectors and accepts them within a cosine tolerance concedes a predictable share of queries to an attacker who controls the vectors: the hijack rate equals the distribution of angular retrieval margins at the tolerance (the margin law). Margins are small in five corpora and two embedding models, so an idealised tolerance at the level of floating-point noise leaves up to 5.5% of queries exposed (at most 1.2% in any corpus once exact duplicate documents are excluded), and a threshold calibrated from our CPU INT8-FP32 comparison of a small embedding model (at the empirical 0.1% quantile of honest cosines) leaves 98-100% exposed; on a Raspberry Pi 5 running a local language model, such an attack lowers correct answers from 0.75 to 0.39. Integrity audits of compressed vector stores fare no better: on a FAISS product-quantisation index over 57,638 documents, tampered vectors that all pass the audit put the attacker's document first for 25% of targets. Verifying quantisation codes instead, with ambiguity decided by the verifier, a calibrated guard band and canonicalisation, accepted every honest vector in our samples on three platforms and left the publisher no choice. We also show that common floating-point and dynamic-INT8 inference pipelines are not bit-reproducible across batch sizes or architectures, and report pre-registered negative results on abstention, context pruning and semantic screening. We release code and data.

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