Randomized caches protect against side-channel attacks by obfuscating the mapping of memory addresses to cache locations. Existing proposals typically describe architectural behavior, leaving practical hardware implementation challenges largely unexplored. We implement four prominent designs, CEASER-S, ScatterCache, SassCache, and MIRAGE, and integrate them as the last-level cache (LLC) of a multi-core out-of-order RISC-V system-on-chip (SoC). We identify common and design-specific implementation challenges and develop practical solutions. We evaluate complete FPGA implementations by running SPEC CPU 2017 rate and GAPBS workloads to completion, providing, to our knowledge, the first comparative evaluation of these designs on a common full-system hardware platform. Pipelining the index derivation function (IDF) alone is insufficient: in three of the four variants, other components become the frequency bottleneck, reducing frequency by up to 35% relative to the baseline set-associative cache. Redesigning the critical paths while preserving mappings, rekeying, and victim-selection policies brings the three affected variants to no more than 10% below the baseline frequency, at the cost of added latency or reduced concurrency. Increased LLC access latency, rather than additional misses, dominates IPC degradation, reducing instructions per cycle by up to 5% for SPEC and 11% for GAPBS. Hardware overhead depends on the design and implementation technology: FPGA lookup-table usage increases by 10-35%, while ASIC area increases by 1-14%.

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