Resource allocation problems across multiple contests are ubiquitous in adversarial settings, from military operations to market competition. While Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games have provided valuable theoretical foundations for such problems, their equilibrium characterizations typically permit resources to be arbitrarily allocated across all contests -- a flexibility that rarely aligns with practical constraints. This paper introduces a novel constrained variant of the General Lotto game where one player is restricted to allocating resources to only a single contest. In this model we provide lower and upper bounds on the security values for this constrained player, quantifying how the inability to distribute resources across multiple contests fundamentally changes optimal strategic behavior and performance guarantees. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how operational constraints shape strategic outcomes in competitive resource allocation, with implications for decision-makers facing similar constraints in practice.

翻译：资源分配问题在对抗性环境中普遍存在，从军事行动到市场竞争均涉及多场竞争。尽管Colonel Blotto博弈和General Lotto博弈为此类问题提供了重要的理论基础，但其均衡刻画通常允许资源在全部竞争间任意分配——这种灵活性在实践中很少符合约束条件。本文提出了一种新颖的约束性General Lotto博弈变体，其中一方参与者被限制仅将资源分配至单一竞争。在该模型中，我们给出了该约束参与者的安全值上下界，量化了无法跨多场竞争分配资源如何从根本上改变最优策略行为与性能保证。这些发现有助于更广泛地理解运营约束如何塑造竞争性资源分配中的战略结果，对面临类似约束的实践决策者具有启示意义。