We fully characterize how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in dynamic binary-action supermodular games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent in good times, but injects asymmetric and inconclusive public information if players lose faith. There is (i) no multiplicity gap: the largest (partially) implementable equilibrium can be implemented uniquely; and (ii) no intertemporal commitment gap: the policy is sequentially optimal. Our results have sharp implications for the design of policy in coordination environments.

翻译：我们完整刻画了在动态二元行动超模博弈中，应如何提供动态信息以唯一实现最大均衡。设计者提供一种信息看跌期权：她在形势良好时保持沉默，但当参与者失去信心时，则注入非对称且非结论性的公共信息。该机制具有以下特性：(i) 无多重性缺口：最大（部分）可实现的均衡能够被唯一实现；(ii) 无跨期承诺缺口：该策略是序贯最优的。我们的研究结果对协调环境中的政策设计具有明确启示。