Reliable grid operation depends on accurate and timely telemetry, making modern power systems vulnerable to communication layer cyberattacks. This paper evaluates how Denial of Service (DoS), Denial of Data (DoD), and False Data Injection (FDI) attacks disrupt the IEEE 14 bus system using a MATLAB only, time stepped simulation framework built on MATPOWER. The framework emulates a 24 hour operating cycle with sinusoidal load variation, introduces attack specific manipulation of load and voltage data, and performs full AC power flow solves with reactive limit enforcement (PV PQ switching). At each timestep, the system logs true and measured voltages, generator P/Q output, system losses, and voltage limit violations to capture transient cyber physical effects. Results show that DoD causes the largest physical distortions and reactive power stress, DoS masks natural variability and degrades situational awareness, and FDI creates significant discrepancies between true and perceived voltages. The study provides a compact, reproducible benchmark for analyzing cyber induced instability and informing future defense strategies.

翻译：电网的可靠运行依赖于准确及时的遥测数据，这使得现代电力系统易受通信层网络攻击的影响。本文评估了拒绝服务攻击、数据拒绝攻击与虚假数据注入攻击如何干扰IEEE 14节点系统，所用的是一个仅基于MATLAB、构建于MATPOWER之上的时间步进仿真框架。该框架模拟了一个具有正弦负荷变化的24小时运行周期，引入了针对负荷和电压数据的攻击特定操纵，并执行了完整的交流潮流计算，同时强制执行无功限值。在每个时间步，系统记录真实电压与测量电压、发电机有功/无功出力、系统损耗以及电压越限情况，以捕捉瞬态的赛博物理效应。结果表明，数据拒绝攻击导致最大的物理畸变和无功功率应力，拒绝服务攻击掩盖了自然波动并降低了态势感知能力，而虚假数据注入攻击则在真实电压与感知电压之间造成了显著差异。本研究为分析网络攻击引发的失稳现象以及为未来防御策略的制定提供了一个简洁、可复现的基准。