Wireless networks are highly vulnerable to spoofing attacks, especially when attackers transmit consecutive spoofing packets. Conventional physical layer authentication (PLA) methods have mostly focused on single-packet spoofing attack. However, under consecutive spoofing attacks, they become ineffective due to channel evolution caused by device mobility and channel fading. To address this challenge, we propose a channel prediction-based PLA framework. Specifically, a Transformer-based channel prediction module is employed to predict legitimate CSI measurements during spoofing interval, and the input of channel prediction module is adaptively updated with predicted or observed CSI measurements based on the authentication decision to ensure robustness against sustained spoofing. Simulation results under Rayleigh fading channels demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves low prediction error and significantly higher authentication accuracy than conventional benchmark, maintaining robustness even under extended spoofing attacks.

翻译：无线网络极易遭受欺骗攻击，尤其是当攻击者发送连续欺骗数据包时。传统物理层认证方法主要针对单数据包欺骗攻击，但在设备移动和信道衰落导致的信道时变环境下，面对连续欺骗攻击往往失效。为应对这一挑战，我们提出一种基于信道预测的物理层认证框架。具体而言，采用基于Transformer的信道预测模块在欺骗攻击间隔期间预测合法信道状态信息（CSI）测量值，并根据认证决策自适应地切换预测或观测CSI作为预测模块输入，从而确保对持续欺骗攻击的鲁棒性。在瑞利衰落信道下的仿真结果表明，与传统基准方法相比，所提方案实现了更低的预测误差和显著提升的认证精度，即使在长时间欺骗攻击下仍能保持鲁棒性。