Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) prove the integrity of code and data to a remote peer through remote attestation: the TEE issues an attestation report by signing, with a hardware-bound key, its configuration information, including measurements (cryptographic digests) of the code loaded inside it. A verifier appraises the report by matching these measurements against reference values. When the measured artifact is proprietary, however, the verifier cannot derive the reference values itself: it can only confirm that something with a given measurement is running inside the TEE---not that the program behaves as expected---forcing full trust in the reference value provider. We propose an architecture that closes this gap without disclosing the artifact, composing two TEE workloads: attestable build (Hugenroth et al., 2025), which binds a source code digest to a build artifact measurement, and attestable audit (proposed in this paper), which binds the same source code digest to the verdicts of automated audits---fuzzing, static analysis, AI code auditing, formal methods---executed inside a TEE. Both are instances of Confidential Computing Proofs: TEE attestation viewed as a hardware-backed zero-knowledge proof. Chaining the two certificates lets the verifier conclude that the running artifact was built from source code satisfying the audited properties, without disclosing either the source code or the build artifact. A proof-of-concept implementation on Intel SGX with the Gramine Library OS, running the Bandit security analyzer on Python code, demonstrates the practicality of the approach.

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