We extend the notion of boycotts in cooperative games from one-on-one boycotts between single players to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying the impact of boycotts. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.

翻译：我们将合作博弈中抵制行为的概念从单人间的单方抵制扩展为联盟间的抵制。我们证明凸博弈为研究抵制的影响提供了恰当的理论框架。抵制具有异质性效应：在多对一抵制中，被针对的单个玩家受损最为严重，而未参与抵制的玩家反而可能从中获益。