This paper presents a new method for quantum identity authentication (QIA) protocols. The logic of classical zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) due to Schnorr is applied in quantum circuits and algorithms. This novel approach gives an exact way with which a prover $P$ can prove they know some secret by encapsulating it in a quantum state before sending to a verifier $V$ by means of a quantum channel - allowing for a ZKP wherein an eavesdropper or manipulation can be detected with a fail-safe design. This is achieved by moving away from the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem towards the hardness of estimating quantum states. This paper presents a method with which this can be achieved and some bounds for the security of the protocol provided. With the anticipated advent of a `quantum internet', such protocols and ideas may soon have utility and execution in the real world.

翻译：本文提出了一种量子身份认证协议的新方法。Schnorr提出的经典零知识证明逻辑被应用于量子电路与算法中。这种新颖方法为证明者P提供了一种精确方式——通过将秘密封装在量子态中，再经由量子信道发送给验证者V，从而在零知识证明中实现防窃听与防篡改的故障安全设计。该方案将安全性从离散对数问题的计算困难性转向量子态估计的困难性。本文给出了具体实现方法，并提供了协议安全性的若干界值。随着“量子互联网”的预期到来，此类协议与思想有望在现实世界中获得实际应用与执行。