We extend the notion of boycotts in cooperative games from one-on-one boycotts between single players to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying the impact of boycotts. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.

翻译：我们将合作博弈中抵制的概念从单人之间的一对一抵制扩展至联盟之间的抵制。证明凸博弈为研究抵制的影响提供了恰当框架。抵制呈现异质性效应：遭受多人对单人抵制的个体参与者损失最大，而未参与抵制的参与者反而可能从中获益。