Noise flooding is a standard defense against decryption attacks on approximate homomorphic encryption, but its security proof is unusually sensitive to composition. Replacing each of $q$ adaptive decryption answers with a statistically close simulation and applying an ordinary hybrid argument loses linearly in $q$. The cryptographic proof instead accumulates conditional Kullback-Leibler (KL) costs and converts to statistical distance once, giving the parameter-critical square-root loss. We machine-check this argument using Rocq and SSProve. Given any fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is approximately correct and IND-CPA secure, we formalize a reduction for every $q$-query IND-CPAD adversary and prove \[ \Pr[\mathsf{IND\text{-}CPAD}_{\mathsf{NF}}^{\mathcal A}=1] \leq β_{\mathsf{CPA}}(\mathcal B_{\mathcal A,q}) + \frac{\sqrt{qn}}{2γ}. \] where $n$ is the plaintext dimension and $γ$ is the flooding-width multiplier. Our proof constructs a new relational program logic over SSProve semantics. Its Pythagorean judgment composes conditional KL budgets without converting them to statistical distance, and a verified trace compiler lifts a local oracle rule to arbitrary adaptive programs with a single final conversion.

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