Ransomware has yet to reach orbit, but the conditions for such an attack already exist. This paper presents the first game-theoretic framework for modeling ransomware against satellites: the orbital escalation game. In this model, the attacker escalates ransom demands across orbital passes, while the defender chooses their best strategy, e.g., attempt a restore procedure. Using dynamic programming, we solve the defender's optimal strategy and the attacker's expected payoff under real orbital constraints. Additionally, we provide a GPS III satellite case study that demonstrates how our orbital escalation game can be applied in the context of a fictional but feasible ransomware attack to derive the best strategies at every step. In conclusion, this foundational model offers satellite owners, policy makers and researchers, a formal framework to better prepare their responses when a spacecraft is held for ransom.

翻译：勒索软件尚未进入轨道，但此类攻击的条件已然具备。本文提出了首个针对卫星勒索软件的博弈论建模框架：轨道升级博弈。在该模型中，攻击者通过多次轨道过境逐步升级勒索要求，而防御者则选择其最优策略（例如尝试恢复程序）。利用动态规划方法，我们在实际轨道约束条件下求解了防御者的最优策略与攻击者的预期收益。此外，我们通过GPS III卫星的案例研究，展示了如何将轨道升级博弈应用于虚构但可行的勒索攻击场景，从而推演出每个阶段的最佳应对策略。综上所述，这一基础模型为卫星所有者、政策制定者和研究人员提供了一个形式化框架，使其能更好地为航天器遭受勒索的情况做好应对准备。