In crowdsourcing, a group of common people is asked to execute the tasks and in return will receive some incentives. In this article, one of the crowdsourcing scenarios with multiple heterogeneous tasks and multiple IoT devices (as task executors) is studied as a two-tiered process. In the first tier of the proposed model, it is assumed that a substantial number of IoT devices are not aware of the hiring process and are made aware by utilizing their social connections. Each of the IoT devices reports a cost (private value) that it will charge in return for its services. The participating IoT devices are rational and strategic. The goal of the first tier is to select the subset of IoT devices as initial notifiers so as to maximize the number of IoT devices notified with the constraint that the total payment made to the notifiers is within the budget. For this purpose, an incentive compatible mechanism is proposed. In the second tier, a set of quality IoT devices is determined by utilizing the idea of single-peaked preferences. The next objective of the second tier is to hire quality IoT devices for the floated tasks. For this purpose, each quality IoT device reports private valuation along with its favorite bundle of tasks. In the second tier, it is assumed that the valuation of the IoT devices satisfies gross substitute criteria and is private. For the second tier, the truthful mechanisms are designed independently for determining the quality IoT devices and for hiring them and deciding their payment respectively. Theoretical analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms are computationally efficient, truthful, correct, budget feasible, and individually rational. The simulation is done to measure the efficacy of the proposed mechanisms with the benchmark mechanisms based on truthfulness, budget feasibility, and running time.

翻译：在众包中，一群普通人被要求执行任务，并因此获得相应激励。本文研究了包含多个异构任务和多个物联网设备（作为任务执行者）的众包场景，将其建模为双层过程。在所提模型的第一层中，假设大量物联网设备并不知晓雇佣流程，需要通过利用其社交关系使其知晓。每个物联网设备报告其提供服务的成本（私有价值）。参与物联网设备是理性和策略性的。第一层的目标是在支付给通知者的总成本不超过预算的约束下，选择子集物联网设备作为初始通知者，以最大化被通知的物联网设备数量。为此，提出了一种激励相容机制。在第二层中，利用单峰偏好思想确定一组优质物联网设备。第二层的下一个目标是针对发布的任务雇佣优质物联网设备。为此，每个优质物联网设备报告私有估价及其偏好的任务组合。在第二层中，假设物联网设备的估价满足总替代性准则且为私有信息。针对第二层，分别独立设计了诚实机制用于确定优质物联网设备、雇佣这些设备并决定其支付。理论分析表明，所提机制在计算上高效、诚实、正确、预算可行且个体理性。通过仿真实验，基于诚实性、预算可行性和运行时间指标，将所提机制与基准机制进行了效能评估。