It is unclear how to restructure ownership when an asset is privately held, and there is uncertainty about the owners' subjective valuations. When ownership is divided equally between two owners, a commonly used mechanism is called a BMBY mechanism. This mechanism works as follows: each owner can initiate a BMBY by naming her price. Once an owner declares a price, the other chooses to sell his holdings or buy the shares of the initiator at the given price. This mechanism is simple and tractable; however, it does not elicit actual owner valuations, does not guarantee an efficient allocation, and, most importantly, is limited to an equal partnership of two owners. In this paper, we extend this rationale to a multi-owner setting. Our proposed mechanism elicits owner valuations truthfully. Additionally, our proposed mechanism exhibits several desirable traits: it is easy to implement, budget balanced, robust to collusion (weakly group strategyproof), individually rational, and ex-post efficient.

翻译：当资产为私人持有且所有者主观估值存在不确定性时，如何重组所有权尚无明确方案。当所有权由两位所有者等额持有时，一种常用机制称为BMBY（买卖选择权）机制。该机制运作方式如下：每位所有者均可通过报价启动BMBY程序。一旦所有者申报价格，另一方需选择以该价格出售其持有的份额或购买发起方的股份。该机制简单易行，但无法获取所有者的真实估值，不能保证配置效率，且最关键的是仅适用于两方等额合伙场景。本文将该机制原理拓展至多所有者场景。我们提出的机制能够真实揭示所有者估值，同时具备多项优良特性：易于实施、预算平衡、抗合谋（弱群体策略防御性）、个体理性及事后有效。