A GNSS timing receiver under spoofing has no nominal-geometry fault for position-domain RAIM to bound: the threat is a slow, common-mode pull of served clock time that the receiver's own time-accuracy flag need not reveal. We make three graded contributions. First, a field measurement: solving the receiver clock trajectory from raw L1 pseudoranges and broadcast ephemeris, we show a recorded over-the-air spoof from the public JammerTest 2024 campaign pulled a u-blox ZED-F9P by about 1.01 ms of served time while it reported at most 51 ns, a gap near 20,000x. Second, an impossibility: against an adversary free to choose the ramp rate, no finite unconditional bound on undetected time error exists under a single self-referential clock-aided monitor, because a ramp slow enough to keep the disciplined reference in lock-step is never alarmed while the error grows without limit, so any finite guarantee is conditional. Third, the conditional bound: the Timing Protection Level (TPL), a model-free monitor's static detectability floor plus the oscillator's coast over the detection latency, holds given detection by an independent cross-satellite consistency check a coherent spoofer does not drive in lock-step. Each term is a closed form over a primitive verified in the open Kshana simulator, so the sum is reproducible by hand. Calibrated on the recorded attack, the budget is 114 ns at one-second recovery and 458 ns at a 60-second coast, thousands of times below the 1.01 ms accepted; a clock-aided sequential test alone gives essentially no protection on this slow ramp (it alarms only near the ~1 ms capture), while the model-free monitor alarms during the ramp. We are explicit: the bound is calibrated, not field-validated; carries no integrity-risk budget; and is reported as a band at long coast. The simulator, bound, and calibration example are open source under AGPL-3.0.

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