We present a new model of collective decision making that captures important crowd-funding and donor coordination scenarios. In the setting, there is a set of projects (each with its own cost) and a set of agents (that have their budgets as well as preferences over the projects). An outcome is a set of projects that are funded along with the specific contributions made by the agents. For the model, we identify meaningful axioms that capture concerns including fairness, efficiency, and participation incentives. We then propose desirable rules for the model and study, which sets of axioms can be satisfied simultaneously. An experimental study indicates the relative performance of different rules as well as the price of enforcing fairness axioms.

翻译：我们提出了一种新的集体决策模式,它反映了重要的人群筹资和捐助方协调设想。在这种背景下,有一套项目(每个项目都有自己的成本)和一套代理机构(有各自的预算和对项目的偏好 ) 。结果之一是一套项目得到了资金以及代理机构提供的具体捐款。对于这个模式,我们确定有意义的轴心,抓住各种关切,包括公平、效率和参与激励。然后,我们为模型和研究提出可取的规则,可以同时满足几组轴心。一项实验研究显示了不同规则的相对性能以及执行公平轴心的代价。