We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping approvals, where each such action comes at a cost and we are limited by a budget. We assume our elections to either have the candidate interval or the voter interval property, and we require the property to hold also after the bribery. While structured elections usually make manipulative attacks significantly easier, our work also shows examples of the opposite behavior. We conclude by presenting preliminary insights regarding the destructive variant of our problem.

翻译：我们研究了在结构化多赢家批准选举背景下建设性贿赂的计算复杂性。给定这样的选举，我们探讨是否可以通过增加、删除或交换批准投票，使得某个特定候选者加入获胜委员会，其中每个操作都有成本且受预算限制。我们假设选举要么具有候选者区间性质，要么具有投票者区间性质，并要求贿赂后该性质仍然保持。虽然结构化选举通常会使操纵性攻击变得显著容易，但我们的工作也展示了相反行为的例子。最后，我们针对问题的破坏性变体提出了初步见解。