Many theorists of creativity maintain that intentional agency is a necessary condition of creativity. We argue that this requirement, which we call the Intentional Agency Condition (IAC), should be rejected as a general condition of creativity, while retaining its relevance in specific contexts. We show that recent advances in generative AI have rendered the IAC increasingly problematic, both descriptively and functionally. We offer two reasons for abandoning it at the general level. First, we present corpus evidence indicating that authors and journalists are increasingly comfortable ascribing creativity to generative AI, despite its lack of intentional agency. This development places pressure on the linguistic intuitions that have traditionally been taken to support the IAC. Second, drawing on the method of conceptual engineering, we argue that the IAC no longer fulfils its core social function. Rather than facilitating the identification and encouragement of reliable sources of novel and valuable products, it now feeds into biases that distort our assessments of AI-generated outputs. We therefore propose replacing the IAC with a consistency requirement, according to which creativity tracks the reliable generation of novel and valuable products. Nonetheless, we explain why the IAC should be retained in specific local domains.

翻译：许多创造力理论家坚持认为，意向性能动作用是创造力的必要条件。我们认为这一要求——我们称之为意向性能动条件（IAC）——应当被摒弃作为创造力的普遍条件，同时保留其在特定情境中的相关性。我们证明，生成式人工智能的最新进展使得IAC在描述性和功能性层面都日益显现出问题。我们提出两个理由来支持在普遍层面放弃该条件：首先，我们提供的语料证据表明，尽管生成式人工智能缺乏意向性能动作用，作者和记者们正日益倾向于将创造力归因于它。这一发展对传统上支持IAC的语言直觉构成了压力。其次，借助概念工程的方法，我们认为IAC已不再能实现其核心社会功能。它不仅未能促进对新颖且有价值产物的可靠来源的识别与激励，反而助长了扭曲我们对AI生成产出评估的认知偏差。因此，我们建议用一致性要求取代IAC，即创造力应与新颖且有价值产物的可靠生成过程保持一致。尽管如此，我们亦阐释了为何IAC在特定局部领域仍应予以保留。