We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items. The seller initially only connects to some buyers who can be directly invited to the sale by the seller. Our goal is to design an auction to incentivize the buyers who are aware of the auction to further invite their neighbors to join the auction. This is challenging because the buyers are competing for the items and they would not invite each other by default. Thus, rewards need to be given to buyers who diffuse information, but the rewards should be carefully designed to guarantee both invitation incentives and the seller's revenue. Solutions have been proposed recently for the settings where each buyer requires at most one unit and demonstrated the difficulties of the design. We move this forward to propose the very first diffusion auction for the multi-unit demand settings to improve both the social welfare and the seller's revenue.

翻译：我们考虑的是拍卖设计问题,即卖方向一组关联的买方出售多个同质物品。每个买方只知道与她直接关联的买方,并且对物品的边际效用估值越来越少。最初,卖方只与一些可以直接邀请卖方出售的买方连接。我们的目标是设计拍卖,鼓励知道拍卖的买方进一步邀请邻居参加拍卖。这具有挑战性,因为买方正在竞争这些物品,他们不会默认地邀请对方。因此,需要向传播信息的买方提供奖励,但应谨慎设计奖励,以保证邀请奖励和卖方收入。最近,为每个买方最需要一个单位的场合提出了解决方案,并展示了设计方面的困难。我们推进这项工作,为多单位需求环境提出首次推广拍卖,以改善社会福利和卖方收入。</s>