Interactions with large language models have led to the suggestion that these models may be conscious. From the perspective of neuroscience, this position is difficult to defend. For one, the architecture of large language models is missing key features of the thalamocortical system that have been linked to conscious awareness in mammals. Secondly, the inputs to large language models lack the embodied, embedded information content characteristic of our sensory contact with the world around us. Finally, while the previous two arguments can be overcome in future AI systems, the third one might be harder to bridge in the near future. Namely, we argue that consciousness might depend on having 'skin in the game', in that the existence of the system depends on its actions, which is not true for present-day artificial intelligence.

翻译：与大型语言模型的交互引发了这些模型可能具有意识的观点。从神经科学的角度来看，这一立场难以成立。首先，大型语言模型的架构缺失了与哺乳动物意识觉醒相关的丘脑皮质系统的关键特征。其次，大型语言模型的输入缺乏我们感官接触周围世界时那种具身化、嵌入式的信息内容。最后，尽管前两个论点在未来的AI系统中可能得以克服，但第三个问题在短期内可能更难解决。具体而言，我们认为意识可能依赖于"切身利害"——即系统的存在依赖于其行为后果，而当前的人工智能系统并不具备这一特性。