Decentralized cryptocurrencies are payment systems that rely on aligning the incentives of users and miners to operate correctly and offer a high quality of service to users. Recent literature studies the mechanism design problem of the auction serving as a cryptocurrency's transaction fee mechanism (TFM). We present a general framework that captures both myopic and non-myopic settings, as well as different possible strategic models for users. Within this general framework, when restricted to the myopic case, we show that while the mechanism that requires a user to "pay-as-bid", and greedily chooses among available transactions based on their fees, is not dominant strategy incentive-compatible for users, it has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where bids are slightly shaded. Relaxing this incentive compatibility requirement circumvents the impossibility results proven by previous works, and allows for an approximately revenue and welfare optimal, myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), and off-chain-agreement (OCA)-proof mechanism. We prove these guarantees using different benchmarks, and show that the pay-as-bid greedy auction is the revenue optimal Bayesian incentive-compatible, MMIC and 1-OCA-proof mechanism among a large class of mechanisms. We move beyond the myopic setting explored in the literature, to one where users offer transaction fees for their transaction to be accepted, as well as report their urgency level by specifying the time to live of the transaction, after which it expires. We analyze pay-as-bid mechanisms in this setting, and show the competitive ratio guarantees provided by the greedy allocation rule. We then present a better-performing non-myopic rule, and analyze its competitive ratio. The above analysis is stated in terms of a cryptocurrency TFM, but applies to other settings, such as cloud computing and decentralized "gig" economy, as well.

翻译：去中心化加密货币是一种依赖于用户与矿工激励一致性以正确运行并提供高质量服务的支付系统。近期文献研究了作为加密货币交易费用机制（TFM）的拍卖机制设计问题。我们提出了一个通用框架，涵盖短视与非短视两种情景，以及用户的不同策略模型。在此框架下，当限定于短视情形时，我们证明：要求用户“按报价支付”并基于费用贪婪选择可用交易的机制虽非用户的占优策略激励相容，但存在一个出价略微调整的贝叶斯-纳什均衡。放宽此激励相容性要求可规避先前研究证明的不可能性结果，从而允许一种近似收益与福利最优、短视矿工激励相容（MMIC）且链下协议（OCA）免攻击的机制。我们通过不同基准证明这些保证，并表明在大量机制类中，“按报价支付”贪婪拍卖是收益最优的贝叶斯激励相容、MMIC且1-OCA免攻击机制。我们将研究范围扩展至文献中已探索的短视情景之外，考虑用户为其交易被接受支付费用，并通过指定交易存活时间（过期时间）报告其紧急程度。我们分析了该情景下的“按报价支付”机制，并展示了贪婪分配规则提供的竞争比保证。随后提出一种性能更优的非短视规则，并分析其竞争比。上述分析虽以加密货币TFM形式表述，但也适用于云计算及去中心化“零工经济”等其他情景。