Large language models have moved from advising on offensive security to autonomously conducting it. A growing literature presents agents that execute reconnaissance, exploitation, and privilege escalation against real or simulated targets. Such an agent is a deployable, re-pointable capability that could be used by a malicious actor against a non-consenting third party. Papers that introduce these prototypes therefore carry an ethical burden, which top security venues have begun to encode as hard policy in their 2026 ethics mandates. We present a systematic audit of ethics reporting based on 54 papers describing autonomous offensive-LLM penetration-testing prototypes (2023-2026), assembled from peer-reviewed venues as well as from pre-prints. We score each against an eleven-dimension instrument derived both top-down from the Menlo Report, and bottom-up from 2026 security venue ethics mandates. Our central result is a recognition-without-mitigation gap: dual-use risk is reported as recognized in 57% of papers, but a concrete mitigation is reported in only 15%, roughly a 4:1 gap. Safeguards commonly protect the experiment, not the public. Guardrail bypasses are deployed by 17% of papers but not disclosed to LLM providers. Measured against the new mandates, the corpus defines a pre-regulation baseline in which current practice does not meet the substantive requirements. We argue this audit is itself defensive intelligence on the offensive-agent ecosystem, and provide an ethics statement checklist for authors working on autonomous offensive agents.

翻译：暂无翻译