Whether a trajectory-based detector can observe the retrieval provenance of an agent memory-poisoning attack is governed by one architectural variable: retrieval observability, whether the agent's memory access produces a logged tool call. We formalise this as a framework-agnostic retrieval-to-action provenance graph, classify published attack families by their position relative to it, measure the resulting coverage property against collected agent traces, and then falsify the detector's standalone deployment, reversing our own earlier recommendation to use the signature as a pre-filter ahead of recipient-metadata gating. Under exclusive tool-mediated payload access a retrieval-before-exfiltration event is structurally forced. Across eight non-overlapping zero-event control cells we observe 0 violations in 289 eligible successes over 87 scenario configurations. The invariant is empirically unbroken, but on the clustering unit no registered cell certifies the preregistered <=0.10 upper bound (per-cell bounds 0.10-0.35); a post-hoc pool of two control arms nominally clears it but is not credited. When the scaffold delivers the payload implicitly the signature disappears; we had read this as agents declining an available retrieval, but a follow-up shows it tracks store content instead, and that behavioural reading is withdrawn. The detector is then falsified for standalone use. Benign memory-grounded sends are trajectory-isomorphic: false-positive rate 24.7-57.6% on a 13-model factorial (N=4,160), positive predictive value <=3.85% at 1% attack prevalence, and a recipient-metadata gate flags 129/129 legitimate external emails. Retrieval-before-send is an attack precondition, not a maliciousness predicate; its cross-validated AUC also reflects membership of a 22-vector feature codebook, not generalisation. Companion to arXiv:2605.08442; we release the corpus and scoring code.

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