This paper offers a framework for the study of strategic behavior in proxy voting, where non-active voters delegate their votes to active voters. We further study how proxy voting affects the strategic behavior of non-active voters and proxies (active voters) under complete and partial information. We focus on the median voting rule for single-peaked preferences. Our results show strategyproofness with respect to non-active voters. Furthermore, while strategyproofness does not extend to proxies, we show that the outcome is bounded and, under mild restrictions, strategic behavior leads to socially optimal outcomes. We further show that our results extend to partial information settings, and in particular for regret-averse agents.

翻译：本文提出一个研究代理投票中策略行为的框架，其中非活跃选民将投票权委托给活跃选民。我们进一步研究了在完全信息和部分信息条件下，代理投票如何影响非活跃选民及代理（活跃选民）的策略行为。聚焦于单峰偏好下的中位数投票规则。研究结果表明，非活跃选民具备策略防禦性。此外，虽然策略防禦性不适用于代理，但结果显示投票结果具有有界性，且在温和约束下，策略行为可导向社会最优结果。我们进一步证明，这些结论可推广至部分信息场景，尤其适用于风险厌恶型代理人。