Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) design in blockchain protocols has gained significant attention following the pioneering work of Roughgarden [EC' 21], which established a formal framework for analyzing user and block proposer incentives under various Transaction Fee Mechanisms, including Ethereum's current fee mechanism EIP-1559. However, the original TFM framework and follow-up TFM works overlook the critical challenge of censorship resistance-specifically in the presence of an external malicious actor who is willing to bribe the proposer to censor a transaction. In this paper, we extend the Roughgarden's framework to capture censorship resistance under bribery attacks via a Bayesian game, where a strategic block proposer's "type" is determined by a bribe function from an external malicious actor. Under this framework, the definition of a standard TFM is extended to a bribery-aware TFM. This technique is broadly applicable to analyze censorship resistance under bribery attacks of both single and multiple proposer protocols within the original TFM scope. We choose to utilize it to evaluate the incentive compatibility and censorship resistance of several TFMs within the context of a multiple proposer protocol called Fork-Choice Enforced Inclusion Lists (FOCIL). FOCIL represents a critical evolution in the Ethereum roadmap, serving as the consensus and censorship resistance flagship for the upcoming Hegota hard fork. It aims to bolster Ethereum's censorship resistance by enabling multiple proposers to contribute to block construction. While recent works such as Garimidi et al.[FC' 25] have extended the TFM framework to multiple proposer settings, they do not aim to capture censorship under bribery attacks and they are not compatible with the unique hierarchical structure of FOCIL.

翻译：交易费用机制（TFM）设计在区块链协议中受到广泛关注，其研究始于Roughgarden [EC' 21]的开创性工作。该工作建立了分析用户与区块提议者在不同交易费用机制（包括以太坊当前机制EIP-1559）下激励行为的正式框架。然而，原始TFM框架及其后续研究忽视了抗审查能力这一关键挑战——尤其是在存在外部恶意行为者愿意贿赂提议者以审查特定交易的情况下。本文通过贝叶斯博弈将Roughgarden框架扩展至贿赂攻击下的抗审查能力分析，其中战略性区块提议者的"类型"由外部恶意行为者的贿赂函数决定。在此框架下，标准TFM的定义被扩展为"贿赂感知型TFM"。该技术具有广泛适用性，可用于分析原始TFM范畴内单一及多提议者协议在贿赂攻击下的抗审查能力。我们选择将其应用于名为"分叉选择强制包含列表（FOCIL）"的多提议者协议中若干TFM的激励相容性与抗审查能力评估。FOCIL代表了以太坊路线图的关键演进方向，作为即将到来的Hegota硬分叉的共识与抗审查旗舰方案，旨在通过允许多个提议者共同参与区块构建来增强以太坊的抗审查能力。尽管近期研究如Garimidi等人[FC' 25]已将TFM框架扩展至多提议者场景，但这些工作未能捕获贿赂攻击下的审查行为，且不兼容FOCIL独特的层次化结构。