The problem of how to achieve cooperation among rational peers in order to discourage free riding is one that has received a lot of attention in peer-to-peer computing and is still an important one. The field of game theory is applied to the task of finding solutions that will encourage cooperation while discouraging free riding. The cooperative conduct of peers is typically portrayed as a traditional version of the game known as the "Prisoners' Dilemma." It is common knowledge that if two peers engage in a situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma more than once, collaboration can be achieved through the use of punishment. Nevertheless, this is not the case when there is only one interaction between peers. This short article demonstrates that Kantian peers prefer to cooperate and attain social welfare even when they interacted only once. This, dissuade peers from freeriding.

翻译：如何实现理性对等节点间的合作以抑制搭便车行为，是点对点计算领域长期受到关注且至今仍至关重要的问题。博弈论被应用于寻找既能促进合作又能遏制搭便车行为的解决方案。节点的合作行为通常被刻画为经典博弈模型"囚徒困境"。众所周知，当两个对等节点重复进行囚徒困境博弈时，可通过惩罚机制达成合作。然而，当节点间仅存在单次交互时，情况并非如此。本文证明，即使仅发生单次交互，康德式对等节点仍倾向于选择合作并实现社会福利最大化，从而有效抑制搭便车行为。