The inheritance of crypto-assets faces a structural obstacle: ownership is the knowledge of a key, so the key either disappears with its owner or has to be shared beforehand. The Tales From the Crypt Protocol (TFCP) addressed one part of the problem, the distributed and privacy-preserving acknowledgment of a death by a blockchain. We revisit it with a new primitive. A \emph{baryonic key} is a physical object from which bits are obtained only through a measurement, are never stored digitally, and which exists in exactly $n$ copies, where $n$ is neither zero nor unbounded. We define the primitive, outline a candidate instantiation based on a replicated micro-fractured relief, and state its limits: digitising a copy is slow and tamper-evident, not impossible. We also outline other uses of the primitive, from post-quantum pre-shared keys to common coins for Byzantine agreement. We then give a threat model for TFCP, review the attack models of the literature that apply to it, and show where it resists and where it does not. We propose TFCP-B, in which decrypting the will requires both a secret shared among registrars and the response of a baryonic key, and in which heirs claim their share through hash commitments, without any prior key or wallet. We detail each change from TFCP to TFCP-B, with its rationale and its price. TFCP-B removes the anonymity loss caused by colluding registrars and blocks several false-alarm attacks. It does not remove the shallow-account attack, remains exposed to transaction censorship during the deliberation period, and introduces new assumptions on custodians and reading devices. The security arguments are informal and the physical figures are design estimates.
翻译:暂无翻译