We study the universal coding under side-channel attacks posed and investigated by Santoso and Oohama (2021). They proposed a theoretical security model for Shannon cipher system under side-channel attacks, where the adversary is not only allowed to collect ciphertexts by eavesdropping the public communication channel, but is also allowed to collect the physical information leaked by the devices where the cipher system is implemented on such as running time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc. For any distributions of the plain text, any noisy channels through which the adversary observe the corrupted version of the key, and any measurement device used for collecting the physical information, we can derive an achievable rate region for reliability and security such that if we compress the ciphertext using an affine encoder with rate within the achievable rate region, then: (1) anyone with secret key will be able to decrypt and decode the ciphertext correctly, but (2) any adversary who obtains the ciphertext and also the side physical information will not be able to obtain any information about the hidden source as long as the leaked physical information is encoded with a rate within the rate region.

翻译：我们研究了Santoso和Oohama（2021年）提出并探讨的侧信道攻击下的通用编码问题。他们为Shannon密码系统在侧信道攻击下提出了一种理论安全模型，在该模型中，攻击者不仅可以通过窃听公共通信信道收集密文，还可以收集密码系统实现设备泄露的物理信息，如运行时间、功耗、电磁辐射等。对于任何明文分布、攻击者通过噪声信道观察密钥损坏版本的任何信道，以及用于收集物理信息的任何测量设备，我们能够推导出可靠性和安全性的可达速率区域。如果使用仿射编码器以该可达速率区域内的速率压缩密文，则：（1）任何拥有密钥的人都能正确解密和解码密文；（2）任何获得密文及侧物理信息的攻击者，只要泄露的物理信息以该速率区域内的速率进行编码，就无法获取关于隐藏源的任何信息。