Many companies rely on advertising platforms such as Google, Facebook, or Instagram to recruit a large and diverse applicant pool for job openings. Prior works have shown that equitable bidding may not result in equitable outcomes due to heterogeneous levels of competition for different types of individuals. Suggestions have been made to address this problem via revisions to the advertising platform. However, it may be challenging to convince platforms to undergo a costly re-vamp of their system, and in addition it might not offer the flexibility necessary to capture the many types of fairness notions and other constraints that advertisers would like to ensure. Instead, we consider alterations that make no change to the platform mechanism and instead change the bidding strategies used by advertisers. We compare two natural fairness objectives: one in which the advertisers must treat groups equally when bidding in order to achieve a yield with group-parity guarantees, and another in which the bids are not constrained and only the yield must satisfy parity constraints. We show that requiring parity with respect to both bids and yield can result in an arbitrarily large decrease in efficiency compared to requiring equal yield proportions alone. We find that autobidding is a natural way to realize this latter objective and show how existing work in this area can be extended to provide efficient bidding strategies that provide high utility while satisfying group parity constraints as well as deterministic and randomized rounding techniques to uphold these guarantees. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed solutions on data adapted from a real-world employment dataset.

翻译：许多公司依赖Google、Facebook或Instagram等广告平台，为职位空缺招募大量且多样化的求职者群体。先前的研究表明，由于不同类型个体面临的竞争程度存在异质性，公平出价可能无法产生公平的结果。已有建议提出通过修改广告平台来解决这一问题。然而，说服平台对其系统进行成本高昂的改造可能具有挑战性，而且这种改造可能无法提供足够的灵活性来捕捉广告主希望确保的多种公平概念和其他约束条件。相反，我们考虑不改变平台机制，而是改变广告主使用的投标策略。我们比较了两种自然的公平目标：一种是广告主在出价时必须平等对待各类群体，以确保产出具有群体均等性保证；另一种是出价不受限制，仅产出需满足均等性约束。我们证明，与仅要求产出比例均等相比，同时要求出价和产出均等可能导致效率任意大的降低。我们发现，自动出价是实现后一种目标的自然方式，并展示了如何扩展该领域的现有工作，以提供高效的投标策略，这些策略在满足群体均等性约束的同时提供高效用，以及如何利用确定性和随机化舍入技术来维持这些保证。最后，我们在改编自真实世界就业数据集的数据上展示了所提出解决方案的有效性。