Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block rewards. We analyze some of the incentive compatibility issues that arise from transaction fees, which relate to the bids that users submit, the allocation rules that miners use to choose which transactions to include, and where they choose to mine in the context of longest-chain consensus. We start by surveying a variety of mining attacks including undercutting, fee sniping, and fee-optimized selfish mining. Then, we move to analyzing mechanistic notions of user incentive compatibility, myopic miner incentive compatibility, and off-chain-agreement-proofness, as well as why they are provably incompatible in their full form. Then, we discuss weaker notions of nearly and $\gamma$-weak incentive compatibility, and how all of these forms of incentive compatibility hold or fail in the trustless auctioneer setup of blockchains, examining classical mechanisms as well as more recent ones such as Ethereum's EIP-1559 mechanism and \cite{chung}'s burning second-price auction. Throughout, we generalize and interrelate existing notions, provide new unifying perspectives and intuitions on analysis, and discuss both specific and overarching open problems for future work.

翻译：交易费是许多区块链系统中激励处理交易的主要手段。然而，与固定区块奖励等替代方案相比，它们也引入了大量的激励不对称性。我们分析了由交易费引发的一些激励相容性问题，这些问题涉及用户提交的出价、矿工选择包含哪些交易的分配规则，以及在最长链共识背景下矿工选择挖矿的位置。首先，我们调查了多种挖矿攻击，包括低价挖矿、费用狙击和费用优化的自私挖矿。随后，我们转向分析用户激励相容性、短视矿工激励相容性以及链下协议防伪性的机制概念，并解释为何它们的完整形式在理论上不可相容。接着，我们讨论了近似及$\gamma$-弱激励相容性等较弱的概念，以及在区块链无信任拍卖人设置中这些激励相容性形式如何成立或失效，考察了经典机制和更近期的机制，如以太坊的EIP-1559机制和\cite{chung}的燃烧第二价格拍卖。在整个过程中，我们概括并关联了现有概念，提供了新的统一视角和分析直觉，并讨论了未来工作中具体及总体性的开放问题。