On several proof-of-stake blockchains, agents engaged in validating transactions can open a pool to which others can delegate their stake in order to earn higher returns. We develop a model of staking pool formation in the presence of malicious agents and establish existence and uniqueness of equilibria. We then identify potential and risk of staking pools. First, allowing for staking pools lowers blockchain security. Yet, honest stake holders obtain higher returns. Second, by choosing welfare optimal distribution rewards, staking pools prevent that malicious agents receive large rewards. Third, when pool owners can freely distribute the returns from validation to delegators, staking pools disrupt blockchain operations, since malicious agents attract most delegators by offering generous returns.

翻译：在几条有证据的链条上,参与验证交易的代理人可以打开一个集合库,让其他人将股份分给另一人,以获得更高的回报。我们开发了一个在恶意代理人面前进行收集池形成的模式,并确立了平衡的存在和独特性。我们然后确定了集资的潜力和风险。首先,允许集资,降低供应链安全。然而,诚实的股东获得更高的回报。第二,选择福利最佳分配奖励,集资防止恶意代理人获得巨额回报。第三,集资业主可以将核证的收益自由分配给拆解者,集资扰乱了集资业务,因为恶意代理人通过慷慨回报吸引了大多数拆解者。