A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to the rules of a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, which enables players to verify incentive properties in advance and the outcome in retrospect. However, public declaration can reveal superfluous information that the mechanism designer might prefer not to disclose, such as her target function or private costs. Avoiding this may be possible via a trusted mediator; however, the availability of a trusted mediator, especially if mechanism secrecy must be maintained for years, might be unrealistic. We propose a new approach to commitment, and show how to commit to, and run, any given mechanism without disclosing it, while enabling the verification of incentive properties and the outcome -- all without the need for any mediators. Our framework is based on zero-knowledge proofs -- a cornerstone of modern cryptographic theory. Applications include non-mediated bargaining with hidden yet binding offers.

翻译：机制设计中一个强大的特性是能够不可撤销地承诺机制的规则。承诺通过公开宣告实现，这使参与者能够事先验证激励属性，并在事后核实结果。然而，公开宣告可能泄露机制设计者不愿披露的多余信息，例如其目标函数或私人成本。通过可信中介或许可以避免这一问题；然而，可信中介的存在（尤其是在机制保密性需要长期维持的情况下）可能不切实际。我们提出了一种新的承诺方法，展示了如何在无需任何中介的情况下，在不披露机制本身的前提下承诺并运行任意给定机制，同时实现激励属性和结果的可验证性。我们的框架基于零知识证明——现代密码学理论的基石。应用包括具有隐藏但具有约束力出价的非中介谈判。