In ranked-choice voting, a Condorcet-winning set is a group of candidates for which no outside candidate is preferred to every member of the group by a majority of voters. We study Condorcet-winning sets in planar metric elections, where voters rank candidates according to their distance under a given norm. We formulate general metric elections, peer selection, and the one-round Voronoi game as instances of a two-player Stackelberg game and place these problems in a common hierarchy. We also introduce a new variant, which we call strong peer selection. Our main result concerns peer selection under the $\ell_1$ and $\ell_\infty$ norms. We prove that every planar instance admits a Condorcet-winning set of size at most three, even under strong peer selection. This follows from a new result for strong rectangular $\varepsilon$-nets. We show that, for every set of points in the plane, one can choose at most three input points that intersect every axis-parallel rectangle containing more than half of the points, improving the previous threshold of $9 / 16$ due to Ashok et al. Under the $\ell_2$ norm, we prove that every planar metric election admits a Condorcet-winning set of size at most four, improving on the general bound of five due to Song et al. Finally, we give new norm-independent bounds for the one-round Voronoi game.

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