Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an arbitrary number of strategies on graphs is still missing. Here, we solve this by drawing an analogy with the Ball-and-Box problem, based on which we show that the local configuration of multiplayer games on graphs is equivalent to distributing $k$ identical co-players among $n$ distinct strategies. We use this to derive the replicator equation for any $n$-strategy multiplayer game under weak selection, which can be solved in polynomial time. As an example, we revisit the second-order free-riding problem, where costly punishment cannot truly resolve social dilemmas in a well-mixed population. Yet, in structured populations, we derive an accurate threshold for the punishment strength, beyond which punishment can either lead to the extinction of defection or transform the system into a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle. The analytical solution also qualitatively agrees with the phase diagrams that were previously obtained for non-marginal selection strengths. Our framework thus allows an exploration of any multi-strategy multiplayer game on regular graphs.
翻译:图上的多人博弈是理解支配重要社会与自然系统的关键演化过程的理论基础。然而,目前仍缺乏一个能够解决正则图上具有任意策略数量的多人博弈问题的统一理论框架。本文通过类比“球与盒子”问题,证明正则图上多人博弈的局部构型等价于将$k$个相同参与者分配到$n$种不同策略中,从而解决了这一难题。基于此,我们推导出弱选择条件下任意$n$策略多人博弈的复制动力学方程,该方程可在多项式时间内求解。以二阶搭便车问题为例——在该问题中,高代价惩罚无法真正解决均匀混合种群中的社会困境——我们发现,在结构化种群中,惩罚强度存在一个精确阈值:超过该阈值后,惩罚可能导致背叛行为彻底消亡,或使系统转变为类似“石头-剪刀-布”的循环模式。该解析解在定性层面与先前针对非边缘选择强度获得的相图一致。因此,我们的框架能够探索正则图上任意多策略多人博弈的演化动态。