We study dynamic pricing for gains-from-trade maximization in two-sided markets. Over $T$ rounds, a platform posts prices to traders with fixed, unknown costs and values and learns from their accept/reject decisions. Under weak budget balance and random matching among accepting traders, we investigate how market composition and pricing flexibility affect the regret achievable by deterministic learning policies. Uniform pricing achieves constant regret in bilateral trade and $O(\log\log T)$ regret in one-to-many markets, with both rates remaining order-optimal even when side-specific pricing is allowed. However, side-specific pricing incurs $Ω(T)$ worst-case regret with only three sellers and three buyers. This barrier persists even when a common price achieves the optimum under full information. The difficulty arises from a mismatch phenomenon: less efficient accepting traders can displace more efficient traders, making price exploration costly. We overcome this barrier through segmented pricing, which partitions each side into at most two groups and assigns a price to each group. Our algorithm achieves $O(n\log\log T + n^2)$ regret with $n$ traders on each side, which is order-optimal in the horizon. Thus, limited price differentiation within each side restores vanishing average regret even when the platform seeks to maximize gains-from-trade. We also extend our results to contextual markets and show that side-specific pricing suffices for doubly logarithmic regret under contextual profit maximization.
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